THE IMPLEMENTATION OF *OPERAÇÃO ACOLHIDA* IN ADDRESSING THE VENEZUELAN MIGRATION CRISIS 2019-2022

UNDERGRADUATE THESIS

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FACULTY OF SOCIO CULTURAL SCIENCE

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Proposed to the Department of International Relations
Faculty of Socio Cultural Science
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13 Agustus 2026



Fitria Eka Wardani

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACP	: Advanced Care Post
CBI	: Cash-Based Intervention
CFAE	: Comitê Federal de Assistência Emergencial
FT Log Hum	: Força-Tarefa Logística Humanitári
IOM	: International Organization for Migration
PCA	: Protection and Care Area
UNHCR	: United Nations High Comission for Refugees

ABSTRACT

The Venezuela migration crisis has driven a sharp increase in the number of Venezuelan migrants entering Brazil, particularly through the Roraima border region. This prompted the Brazilian government to launch *Operação Acolhida* to address humanitarian needs while managing the inflow of migrants through reception, protection, and interiorization. This study aims to analyze how the Brazilian government implemented *Operação Acolhida* in addressing the Venezuelan migration crisis from 2019 to 2022, involving the Brazilian Armed Forces as the primary actor along with UNHCR and IOM as supporting actors. This study employs a qualitative method, analyzed using Donald S. Van Meter and Carl E. Van Horn's policy implementation model. The findings show that *Operação Acolhida* had clear standards and objectives, adequate resources, competent implementing agencies, effective inter-organizational coordination, and strong disposition of implementer, despite the COVID-19 pandemic. However, social, economic, and political conditions in Roraima posed significant obstacles to the policy's optimal implementation.

Keywords: Brazil*, Venezuela migration crisis, Operação Acolhida,* policy implementation, Van Meter and Van Horn

ABSTRAK

Krisis migrasi Venezuela telah mendorong peningkatan jumlah migran Venezuela yang memasuki Brazil, khususnya melalui wilayah perbatasan Roraima. Kondisi ini mendorong pemerintah Brazil meluncurkan Operação Acolhida *untuk menangani kebutuhan kemanusiaan sekaligus mengelola arus masuk migran Venezuela melalui penerimaan, perlindungan, dan interiorisasi migran ke wilayah lain. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis bagaimana pemerintah Brazil mengimplementasikan* Operação Acolhida *dalam menangani krisis migrasi Venezuela pada periode 2019–2022, dengan melibatkan Angkatan Bersenjata Brazil sebagai aktor pelaksana utama serta UNHCR dan IOM sebagai aktor pendukung. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif, dianalisis menggunakan model implementasi kebijakan dari Donald S. Van Meter dan Carl E. Van Horn. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa* Operação Acolhida *memiliki standar dan tujuan yang jelas, sumber daya yang memadai, lembaga pelaksana yang kompeten, koordinasi antarorganisasi yang efektif, serta dukungan kuat dari para pelaksana kebijakan, meskipun menghadapi pandemi COVID-19. Namun, kondisi sosial, ekonomi, dan politik di Roraima menjadi hambatan signifikan bagi optimalnya implementasi kebijakan tersebut.*

Kata kunci: *Brazil, krisis migrasi Venezuela, Operação Acolhida,* implementasi kebijakan, Van Meter dan Van Horn

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Migration has been a part of human history since the nomadic era. Today, globalisation has played a significant role in drastically altering migration patterns. According to data from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), the number of international migrants is estimated to have continued to rise over the past 50 years. In 2020, an estimated 281 million people were living in countries other than their countries of birth, equivalent to 3.6 per cent of the world's total population. This figure represents an increase of approximately 128 million compared to 1990, when the number stood at 153 million (McAuliffe, Lee, and Abel 2022). According to Everett S. Lee (1966), four factors cause a person to decide to migrate. The first is push factors related to the place of origin, such as political instability, economic crisis, crime and natural disasters. The second is pull factors originating from the destination, such as better job opportunities and education. The third is barriers to intervention. These include obstacles that can hinder the migration process, such as legal or bureaucratic barriers. The fourth is personal factors. This includes individual factors that influence a person's migration decision, such as family relationships or personal aspirations.

Venezuela was once considered one of the richest countries in Latin America. The country has the largest oil reserves in the world. Revenue from the oil sector accounts for about 95% of Venezuela's total export earnings (BBC, 2018). During Hugo Chávez's administration, oil became the primary source of funding for

various government programs in Venezuela. However, the country's heavy reliance on the oil sector made its economy highly vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices. In 2014, global oil prices plummeted to below US$30 per barrel, causing Venezuela's economy to collapse (Lumintosari 2021). Amidst the deteriorating economic conditions, Nicolás Maduro printed more money to address the crisis. However, this policy led to years of hyperinflation in Venezuela, which was estimated to reach 10 million percent in 2019 (Center for Preventive Action 2026).

Apart from the economic crisis, Venezuela has also been experiencing a political crisis. In May 2018, Nicolás Maduro was re-elected to a six-year term. Two weeks after his inauguration, the Venezuelan National Assembly declared the election results invalid. In 2019, Juan Guaidó, the president of the National Assembly, declared himself Venezuela's interim president. More than 50 countries, have recognized Guaidó as Venezuela's president (Caroll et al. 2020). The political conflict subsequently sparked massive demonstrations that were met with repression by security and armed forces, which intimidated the public to deter them from participating in demonstrations or other forms of protest. Furthermore, there have been numerous reports of human rights violations against demonstrators, particularly in impoverished areas hardest hit by the crisis. The government has also used the judicial system to suppress those who hold views differing from its own, including by trying arrested demonstrators in military courts (Amnesty International,2019).

Political instability and economic pressures have exacerbated the suffering of the Venezuelan people. According to ENCOVI, a household survey conducted by four leading universities in Venezuela, 94% of Venezuelans were living in poverty


in 2018 (Praag, 2019). In addition, Venezuela is facing the collapse of its healthcare system, shortages of food and medicine, malnutrition, and preventable diseases. As a result, the increasingly dire living conditions have forced millions of Venezuelans to leave their country in search of asylum and a better life in other countries (Silva 2023). Based on data from the Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants, the number of Venezuelan refugees and migrants reached 7,131,435 in the world. Meanwhile, the number of refugees and migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean reached 5,986,946 (R4V 2023).

Brazil is one of the Latin American countries receiving Venezuelan migrants. One factor attracting Venezuelan migrants to Brazil is the border's proximity to their homes, which makes Brazil relatively easy to reach. Many migrants arrive in the capital of Roraima on foot from the border (Barbosa et al. 2020). Beyond geographical factors, Brazil also attracts people through access to social and health services. Both Brazilian citizens and foreign citizens living in poverty or extreme poverty can apply to receive benefits from income support programmes such as Bolsa Família. Furthermore, healthcare in Brazil is a universal right guaranteed by the constitution, meaning that both citizens and foreign nationals have the right to access SUS services, including migrants, regardless of their legal status or whether they have the necessary documentation (Leal et al. 2024). Another factor influencing Venezuelans' decision to migrate to Brazil is the presence of family networks. Venezuelan migrants who already had relatives in Brazil could receive information about employment opportunities and potential income. For example, one migrant stated that an aunt living in Brazil informed the family about available

employment with an expected income of around 2,000 reais per month. This information encouraged the family to migrate to Brazil (Almeida et al. 2023).

Venezuelan migration to Brazil faced obstacles when, on February 21, 2019, Maduro closed the Venezuela-Brazil border, limiting migrant mobility to Brazil (Azzi 2021). After nearly three months, the border reopened on May 10, 2019, and the influx of migrants increased, reaching a peak of 893 people on the opening day (R4V 2019). By the end of 2019, the number of incoming migrants reached In 2019, the number of incoming migrants rose to 236,405.

Diagram 1. Venezuelan Migrant Inflows and Outflows in Brazil 2017–2022



Source: R4V (2022)

The main point of entry for Venezuelan migrants to Brazil is Pacaraima, Roraima. The mass influx of migrants has put pressure on the region. The mayor of Pacaraima stated that the municipality is on the verge of social collapse due to the increase in Venezuelan migrants. At the same time, the local government can't cope without federal support (Azzi 2021). The governor of Roraima also said the influx

of Venezuelans is straining public services. More than half of hospital beds are occupied by Venezuelan patients, while 40 of the 46 babies being treated in the neonatal intensive care unit are Venezuelan children. Furthermore, approximately 5,000 Venezuelan children are enrolled in Roraima's public education system (Senado Federal 2019).

The state of Roraima, particularly Pacaraima, located on the Brazil-Venezuela border, and Boa Vista, its capital, face structural, economic, and geographic limitations in meeting migrants' needs. Roraima has the lowest GDP in Brazil and is located in one of the country's most economically disadvantaged regions (Sodre and Gama 2022). Furthermore, its location in northern Brazil and its isolation from the rest of the country, particularly due to the Amazon rainforest, including its rivers, make it difficult for migrants to continue their journey to other regions. As a result, many migrants are concentrated in Roraima (Kanaan 2019). These conditions prompted the Brazilian federal government to establish *Operação Acolhida,* which aims to meet the humanitarian needs of Venezuelan migrants in Brazil and reduce the burden on Roraima. In its implementation, the Brazilian Armed Forces play a key role in managing the logistical and operational aspects of the shelters to ensure the provision of reception services for migrants. In addition, international organizations such as the IOM and UNHCR have made significant contributions through technical support, funding, and coordination with international humanitarian protection networks to support the implementation of the operation (Filho and Silva 2025).

1.2 Research Questions

How does the Brazilian government implement *Operação Acolhida* in addressing the Venezuelan migration crisis from 2019 to 2022?

1.3 Research purposes

The objectives of this research were:

1. To analyze the implementation of *Operação Acolhida* by the Brazilian government in addressing the Venezuelan migration crisis from 2019 to 2022

1.4 Research Scope

In address the Venezuelan migration crisis in Brazil, spanning 2019-2022. The study began in 2019 because it marked the peak of Venezuelan migration to Brazil. That year saw further developments in the Venezuelan crisis, exacerbated by Juan Guaidó declaring himself the country's interim president and calling for resistance to Nicolás Maduro's rule. The year 2022 was chosen because it was still during the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2019–2022 timeframe was used to examine how Operação Acolhida was implemented and adapted in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. The researcher sought to see whether the policy remained capable of carrying out its functions of receiving, protecting, and interiorizing Venezuelan migrants amidst these changing conditions.

This study limited the primary implementing actors to the Brazilian Armed Forces, which comprise the Army, Navy, and Air Force, under the coordination of the Ministry of Defence, and are mandated to implement *Operação Acolhida*. In

addition, the research discusses UNHCR and IOM as supporting actors that play a major role in assisting with the implementation of the operation.

1.5 Literature Review

Previous research or scientific work is needed to serve as the author's reference material in a research paper. This step is taken to help researcher build strong arguments and find novelty that has not been sufficiently explored by previous research so that it can become the basis for new research topics. The researcher found several previous studies relevant to the topics raised in this study.

Erica Sarmiento da Silva and Fernando da Silva Rodrigues, in a journal article titled "*Migrações internacionais contemporâneas e crise de refugiados no arco noroeste do Brasil: o caso do acolhimento de venezuelanos pelo estado de Roraima (2018 – 2019*)", published in 2020, analyze Brazil's capacity to process asylum applications received during 2018 and 2019, as well as the various policies and efforts implemented by the government in response to the situation. The authors explain that the Brazilian government established *Operação Acolhida*, which involved cooperation between various state and non-state actors in migration control, the relocation of asylum seekers, and the resettlement of vulnerable groups (Silva and Rodrigues 2020). This research focuses on the initial stages of the operation's establishment. It does not examine implementation developments beyond 2019.

Aurelio Toaldo Neto, in an article titled "*O Acolhimento Humanitário E A Interiorização Dos Migrantes Venezuelanos Em Roraima*" published in 2022, analyzes the results of the shelter and relocation efforts carried out under *Operação*

Acolhida from 2018 to 2021 considering the number of resources allocated by the federal government in response to the worsening migration crisis in the state of Roraima. The study shows that *Operação Acolhida* has helped shelter and relocate Venezuelan migrants to the interior. Still, the implementation of the relocation remains limited and has not yet fully alleviated the pressure on Roraima. Furthermore, the high resource requirements and the government's fiscal situation pose risks to the program's sustainability (Neto, 2022). This study focuses specifically on the outcomes regarding shelter, relocation, and resource requirements.

Betrix Firginia, in an article titled "*Upaya Brazil Dalam Mengatasi Persoalan Pengungsi Dari Venezuela Tahun 2017–2020*" published in 2021, analyzes the Brazilian government's response to the Venezuelan refugee crisis using David Easton's political systems theory, which comprises four elements: inputs, conversion (processes), outputs, and the environment. Firginia explains that the economic, political, and humanitarian crises in Venezuela since 2014 drove a massive wave of refugees into Brazil, primarily through the state of Roraima, which served as inputs in the form of demands and pressures on the Brazilian political system. The government subsequently converted these demands into a series of policies (outputs), including CNIg Normative Resolution No. 126/2017 regarding temporary residence permits for migrants from bordering countries; the Migration Law No. 13.445/2017, which grants migrants rights equal to those of Brazilian citizens under the law; and Presidential Decrees No. 9.285/2018 and No. 9.286/2018, which acknowledge the vulnerability of Venezuelan migrants due to the humanitarian crisis and establish a Federal Emergency Committee to manage

refugee reception. This study focuses on outputs rather than implementation in the field (Firginia 2021).

The last article written by Josias Marcos de Resende Silva and Thiago da Rocha Passos Gomes and titled "*Resposta Governamental Brasileira à Crise Migratória Venezuelana: A Contribuição do Exército Brasileiro na 'Operação Acolhida'*" published in 2021, analyzes *Operação Acolhida*, focusing on the actions of the Brazilian Army as part of the government's response to the Venezuelan migration crisis. The study's findings indicate that *Operação Acolhida* was a multidisciplinary and integrated response by the Brazilian government, with the army playing a role in supporting various humanitarian logistics activities (Silva and Gomes 2021). This research focuses specifically on the military's contribution.

The four previous studies addressed different aspects in isolation: Silva & Rodrigues examined the operation's initial formation, Neto focused on the budget, Firginia analysed policy outcomes, and Silva & Gomes discussed military capacity. In contrast, this study integrates these various aspects into a single analysis focused on the implementation of *Operação Acolhida*. The distinction also lies in the timeframe. This study examines the operation's implementation during 2019–2022, covering two concurrent crises: the peak of the Venezuelan migration flow to Brazil and the COVID-19 pandemic.


1.6 Research Framework

Policy is one of the most important aspects of state governance, functioning as a guideline for problem-solving, achieving development goals, maintaining stability, and improving public welfare. In order for these formulated goals to be

achieved, policies require an effective implementation process. The effectiveness of a policy depends largely on how the program is executed. A well-designed program provides clear direction for policy implementation so that the expected outcomes can be achieved as planned.

This research can be explored through the policy implementation theory, introduced by Donald S. Van Meter and Carl E. Van Horn, in the journal *The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework*. The model developed by Van Meter and Van Horn states that there are six variables that can determine whether a policy is successfully implemented or fails. The six variables are described below.

Figure 1. Van Meter and Van Horn Policy Implementation Model



Source: *A Model Of The Policy Implementation Process* (Meter, Horn, 1975)

1. Standards and Objectives

   Standards and objectives outline the primary direction a policy aims to achieve. They include not only general provisions but also concrete, specific measures for evaluating program performance. Van Meter and Van Horn illustrate this point with the Oakland Project, run by the Economic

Development Administration, which aimed to create jobs by constructing public facilities. Its success can be seen in the number of jobs created, the identity of the people employed, and the project's progress (Meter and Horn 1975, 464).

2. Resources

Policies require adequate resources to support their implementation. These resources include funding and other incentives that facilitate effective implementation. If policy resources are inadequate, implementation will fail. This was evident in the new towns-in-towns program during the Johnson administration. Under this program, the federal government planned to provide surplus land at low prices to encourage local governments to accept new town development in urban areas. However, the plan was not implemented. The lack of the expected resources was one of the main causes of the program's failure (Meter and Horn 1975, 465).

3. Interorganizational Communication and Enforcement Activities

Policy implementation will be effective if the standards and objectives set are clear and understood by policy implementers. Therefore, communication and coordination regarding these standards and objectives must be consistent and accurate. For example, when implementing Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965, state and local officials initially interpreted the program as general aid because the original provisions did not specify criteria for targeting funds to disadvantaged children. Due to this ambiguity, one state even defined the category of "disadvantaged" so broadly that almost all students were

deemed eligible (Meter and Horn 1975, 479-480).

In addition, in inter-organizational relationships, there are two types of enforcement activities that are most important. First, through technical advice and assistance. Second, the federal government or superiors can encourage policy implementation through various forms of sanctions, both positive and negative (Meter and Horn 1975, 466-467).

4. Characteristics of the Implementing Agencies

Policy implementation can achieve optimal outcomes when the characteristics of the implementing agents are clearly identified. Van Meter and Van Horn identify several institutional characteristics that influence policy implementation, including the competence and size of agency staff, the degree of hierarchical control, political resources, the degree of open communication, and organizational vitality (Meter and Horn 1975, 471). This can be illustrated by the *new towns in-town* program, which depended heavily on the capacity of local officials as implementing agents. Their limitations in mobilizing public support, addressing resistance, and establishing adequate administrative organizations placed additional burdens on the federal government and hindered the achievement of policy objectives (Meter and Horn, 1975, 481).

5. Economic, Social, and Political Conditions

The external environment in which implementation takes place includes factors such as the availability of economic resources, the potential economic and social impacts of policy implementation, and elite attitudes supporting or opposing the policy (Meter and Horn 1975, 471). These

conditions can directly support or limit implementation performance. Unfavourable economic and political conditions are evident in the findings of the President's Advisory Council on the Executive Branch regarding independent regulatory agencies in the United States. The council found that the oil industry's control of information on fuel reserves and supplies makes it difficult for the government to oversee the industry's policies and practices (Meter and Horn 1975, 481).

6. Disposition of Implementers

There are three common elements that influence policy implementation: understanding of the policy, direction response, and intensity of response. Individual perceptions of the policy play a major role. If the policy is considered inconsistent with their perceptions, they may reject it, or implement it according to their own perceptions (Meter and Horn 1975, 472). This can be seen in the differing attitudes of President Kennedy and the US Navy regarding the location of the blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Navy's refusal to fully comply with the President's directive ultimately forced Kennedy to allow some Soviet ships through the blockade after the policy was officially enacted (Meter and Horn 1975, 482).

The Van Meter and Van Horn model is employed because it helps describe the policy implementation process. Using this model enables the research to explain how the Brazilian government implemented *Operação Acolhida* in addressing the Venezuelan migration crisis.

1.7 Provisional Argument

In this study, the author employs Van Meter and Van Horn's policy implementation framework to analyze how the Brazilian government implemented Operação Acolhida in response to the Venezuelan migration crisis between 2019 and 2022. Van Meter and Van Horn identify six variables that determine successful policy implementation: policy standards and objectives; resources; inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities; characteristics of implementing agencies; socio-economic and political conditions; and the dispositions of implementers. Based on this framework, *Operação Acolhida* is assessed as having been implemented relatively successfully, supported by clear standards and objectives, adequate resources, effective inter-organizational relations and enforcement activities, competent implementing agencies, and implementers demonstrating a strong humanitarian commitment. However, the study sees that unfavourable socio-economic and political conditions in Roraima acted as obstacles, preventing the policy from being implemented optimally

1.8 Research methods

1.8.1 Types of research

The researcher used a qualitative research approach. Qualitative methods can help the researcher understand and explain the Brazilian government's efforts to address the Venezuelan migration crisis through *Operação Acolhida*

1.8.2 Subject and Object of the Research

In this study, the Brazilian government as the research subject, and the object was the policies implemented by Brazil to addressing the Venezuelan

migration crisis.

1.8.3 Method of Data Collection

The researchers used secondary data collection methods. The data collected in this study was obtained by the author from various sources, such as books, e-books, journals, news media, government document, and reports issued by state institutions and international organizations.

1.8.4 Process of the Research

The research process began with collecting data from various trusted sources. The researcher analyzed the secondary data then organized it into several sub-chapters which discussed each problem in depth.

1.9 Thesis Outline

To facilitate the understanding of this thesis, it is necessary to provide an overview of the discussion framework.

Chapter 1, encompasses background information discussing the domestic political situation in Venezuela and its migration to Brazil, research question, research objectives, research scope, literature review, research framework, provisional arguments, research method, and thesis outline.

Chapter 2, analyses the standards and objectives, and resources of *Operação Acolhida*

Chapter 3, Examine Brazil's policy implementation in response to the Venezuelan migration crisis using other variables identified by Van Meter and Van Horn, such as inter-organizational communication and law enforcement activities, economic,

social, and political conditions, characteristics of implementing agencies, and the attitudes of policy implementers.

Chapter 4, contains the author's summary and recommendations.

CHAPTER II

STANDARDS, OBJECTIVES, AND RESOURCES OF *OPERAÇÃO ACOLHIDA*

In Chapter 2, the author uses two variables from Van Meter and Van Horn's framework for policy implementation theory to understand the standards, objectives, and measures of success of the policies established by the Brazilian government, as well as the resources that support their implementation. The standards and objectives of *Operação Acolhida* are explained in more detail in subchapter 2.1, while the policy resources that play a role in supporting the implementation of these policies are discussed in subchapter 2.2.

2.1 Policy Standards and Objectives

Standards and objectives outline the primary direction a policy aims to achieve. They include not only general provisions but also concrete, specific measures for evaluating program performance. Policy standards and objectives must be clearly defined, because the success or failure of implementation depends heavily on how well these objectives are understood and used as a reference. Ambiguous standards and objectives can make it difficult for implementers to understand the policy. This can also lead to differences in disposition (Meter and Horn 1975, 464).

President Michel Temer issued *Decreto* No. 9,285, acknowledging the vulnerability of Roraima State resulting from the large-scale influx of Venezuelans driven by the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. This surge in migration caused unplanned and unpredictable population growth, straining local government

capacity to provide basic public services and increasing the demand for shelters and humanitarian aid (Brazil 2018).

This acknowledgement served as the basis for the Brazilian federal government to formulate policy objectives for addressing the Venezuelan migration crisis. The government subsequently issued *Medida Provisória* No. 820 as an emergency legal instrument to manage the crisis. Article 1 established emergency assistance measures to shelter individuals in vulnerable situations resulting from the migration flow caused by the humanitarian crisis (Brazil 2018). Article 4 detailed ten policy target areas: social protection, healthcare, education, job training, human rights guarantees, protection of vulnerable groups, infrastructure and sanitation, public security and strengthened border control, logistics and distribution of essential supplies, and migrant mobility and relocation to the interior (Brazil 2018).

The Brazilian Ministry of Defence translated these general objectives into concrete standards through *Diretriz Ministerial* No. 3, issued on February 28, 2018. This directive established clear operational standards distributed across the branches of the Armed Forces: the Navy was tasked with preparing personnel and material support for the logistics structure and reporting on the availability of food, medicines, and medical equipment; the Army was responsible for providing personnel, materials, and facilities to construct humanitarian shelters and appointing an officer to manage the Pacaraima Hospital; and the Air Force was assigned to integrate logistical support, set up field hospital modules, and organize the transport of migrants to other regions of Brazil (Ministério da Defesa 2018).

This standard represents the indicators that the implementer must achieve to ensure success.

2.2 Policy Resources

In implementing a policy, the availability of resources is a crucial element. Every policy essentially provides resources that facilitate its administrative process. These resources consist of funds or other incentives that can smooth the implementation of a policy. If resources are lacking, the implementation process cannot run optimally (Meter and Horn, 1975, 465).

The Federal Government issued *Medida Provisória* No. 857, allocating an extraordinary credit of 75.280 million reais to the Ministry of Defense to ensure the continuity of funding for *Operação Acolhida* until March 2019 (Sanjurjo, 2023). On April 30, 2019, the Federal Government issued *Medida Provisória* No. 880, authorizing the opening of an even more extraordinary credit of R$ 223,853,000.00 (Brasil, 2019). The budget allocated to the Ministry of Defense was subsequently distributed to the Military Organization through the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces (Ministério da Defesa, 2019).

During the 2019–2022 period, the federal government disbursed funds amounting to R$561,620,388.59 through Budget Action 219C to implement humanitarian reception, conduct interiorization of migrants in vulnerable situations, and strengthen border controls.

Table 1. Budget Realization of *Operação Acolhida* through Budget Action 219C for 2019–2022

Years	Budget Realization
2019	171.046.287,32
2020	145.788.456,95
2021	100.053.643,07
2022	144.730.000,00
Total	561.618.387,34

Source: CGU (n.d.)

Operation Acolhida is carried out by the *Força-Tarefa Logística Humanitária* (FT Log Hum), comprising members of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and led by a Brazilian Army General Officer (Borges, Junior, 2023). By January 2022, around 7,200 military personnel had been involved in *Operação Acolhida* through 12 contingents serving on a rotating basis (Kwasiniki 2022). Furthermore, international organizations such as the IOM and UNHCR have increased their operational presence in Roraima State to support the needs of Venezuelan migrants entering Brazil (Borges, Oliveira, et al., 2024).

The Federal Government provides various resources to Venezuelan migrants through three pillars: border management, shelter provision, and relocation. Under the border management pillar, migrants receive information on the rights of asylum seekers and migrants, and they can apply for refugee status, temporary residence permits, or other forms of legal entry into Brazil. Migrants also receive initial support such as food assistance and vaccination services (Oliveira, 2018).

Under the shelter pillar, Operação Acolhida provides 14 shelters divided into several categories, such as shelters for single men, families with children, couples without children, women, the LGBT+ community, and Indigenous groups. The arrangement of sleeping areas is adjusted according to the resident groups at each location (Vasconcelos & Santos, 2022). The shelters are established in two areas: 12 are located in Boa Vista and 2 in Pacaraima.

Table 2. Number of Refugees and Migrants Sheltered in Boa Vista

Shelter (Boa Vista)	People Sheltered
Jardim Floresta	413 people
Latife Salomão	203 people
Nova Canãa	238 people
Pintolândia	519 people
Rondon 1	515 people
Rondon 2	436 people
Rondon 3	846 people
Santa Tereza	256 people
São Vicente 1	267 people
São Vicente 2	126 people
Tancredo Neves	236 people
13 De Setembro	105 people

Source: (UNCHR 2020)

Table 3. Number of Refugees and Migrants Sheltered in Pacaraima

Shelter (Pacaraima)	People Sheltered
BV-8	44 people
Janokoida	462 people

Source: (UNCHR 2020)

Within the shelters, residents are provided with three meals per day. For non-Indigenous groups, meals are served as ready-to-eat dishes, whereas Indigenous communities receive dry food supplies tailored to their traditional dietary practices and customs (Oliveira, 2018). In addition to meeting food needs, attention is also given to hygiene. Migrants are provided with hygiene kits along with classes on personal hygiene (Silva and Gomes 2021).

Under the internalisation pillar, Venezuelan migrants and refugees from Roraima can voluntarily relocate to other Brazilian states at no cost. This strategy aims to provide vulnerable migrants and refugees with better integration opportunities in their destination areas (Giannini and Figueira 2024). To participate in the interiorization program, Venezuelan migrants and refugees must meet several requirements: hold valid immigration status, have received vaccinations in accordance with Ministry of Health guidelines, undergo a clinical examination, and provide voluntary consent by signing a formal declaration (Sanjurjo 2023).


The interiorization program comprises four modalities tailored to the conditions, needs, and profiles of migrants and refugees. One is the Institutional modality (Shelter to shelter), designed for migrants who previously lived in emergency shelters in Roraima and are willing to relocate to shelters in other cities or states across Brazil. After relocating, beneficiaries may stay in reception centres for up to four months and receive support to facilitate their social and economic integration in the destination area (Sanjurjo 2023).

The second and third modalities of the interiorization strategy, Family Reunification and Social Reunification, enable migrants and refugees to relocate from Roraima to other parts of Brazil where their family members or social network

contacts are already legally settled. In the case of Social Reunification, the relationship may be based on emotional bonds, friendship, or kinship ties that cannot be substantiated by official documentation. The receiving party must be over 21 years of age, willing to host the migrant or refugee, and able to demonstrate sufficient financial and material means to provide housing and support for the beneficiary (Sanjurjo 2023).

The fourth modality of the interiorization strategy operates through employment opportunities. This scheme targets Venezuelan migrants and refugees in Roraima, relocating them to other regions to work for companies that have made jobs available. For highly vulnerable beneficiaries, UNHCR also provides financial assistance during the first month after arrival at the destination, through the CBI scheme (Giannini and Figueira 2024).

Diagram 2. Percentage of Beneficiaries of the Interiorization Strategy by Modalities



Source: (IOM 2022)

Table 4. Number of Internalized Venezuelan Migrants by Federative Unit in 2018-2022

Federative Unit	Total
Santa Catarina	16.958
Paraná	15.621
Rio Grande Sul	13.324
São Paulo	11.210
Amazonas	5.379
Minas Gerais	5.193
Mato Grosso do Sul	5.177
Mato Grosso	3.110
Rio de Janeiro	2.404
Distrito Federal	2.214
Goiás	2.201
Paraiba	1.012
Pernambuco	896
Bahia	854
Rondônia	840
Ceará	483
Expirito Santo	307
Rio Grande do Norte	292
Pará	175
Acre	69
Sergipe	67
Maranhão	54
Tocanties	38

Piaui	18
Alagoas	13
Amapá	6

Source: (IOM 2022)

CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS OF BRAZIL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN ADDRESSING THE VENEZUELAN MIGRATION CRISIS

In the previous chapter, the author discussed *Operação Acolhida* using the variables of standards and objectives as well as policy resources. In this chapter, the analysis is continued with using other variables in Van Meter and Van Horn's policy implementation framework. The discussion is divided into several subchapters, namely subchapter 3.1 discusses on interorganizational communication and enforcement activities, subchapter 3.2 discusses on economic, social, and political conditions, subchapter 3.3 discusses on the characteristics of the implementing agencies, and subchapter 3.4 discusses on the disposition of implementers.

3.1 Interorganizational Communication and Enforcement Activities

Effective implementation requires program standards and objective to be understood by the people responsible for achieving them. Therefore, it is very important to ensure accuracy and consistency in communicating the standards and goals to the implementers. If the communication sources provide different or inconsistent interpretations, policy implementers may face difficulties in understanding and carrying out the intended goals of the policy (Meter and Horn 1975, 466).

Besides communication, successful implementation requires institutional mechanisms and procedures. In the context of interorganizational relations, there are two forms of enforcement activities that can be used to ensure policies are

implemented effectively. First, through technical advice and assistance. Senior officials can help implementers understand federal regulations, structure policy response measures, and provide the physical and technical resources necessary to implement the policy (Meter and Horn 1975, 467).

Second, the federal government or superiors can encourage policy implementation through various forms of sanctions, both positive and negative. This aspect of enforcement can be understood by referring to the classification of normative, remunerative, and coercive power. Although the federal government does not have a direct superior-subordinate relationship with state and local governments, this concept can be used to explain how the federal government influences other organizations in interorganizational relationships. The use of normative and remunerative power is the most commonly applied form of influence. One example is the federal government's efforts to influence the actions of state and local governments through the allocation and symbolic recognition and material rewards (Meter and Horn 1975, 467).

The federal government established a cross-ministerial coordination mechanism through CFAE, which was responsible for setting the guidelines and priorities for federal government actions in implementing emergency assistance. As a member of the CFAE, the Ministry of Defense appointed an Army Operational Coordinator to lead the FT Log Hum. The Operational Coordinator was responsible for carrying out the directives and priorities established by the CFAE and coordinating their implementation (Kanaan 2019)

Following the appointment of the Operational Coordinator for Operação Acolhida, the Ministry of Defense issued *Diretriz Ministerial* No. 3, authorizing the

implementation of the operation under its coordination. The Ministry assigned specific responsibilities to each branch of the Armed Forces. The Commander of the Brazilian Navy was responsible for providing personnel and material support for the operation's logistics structure. The Commander of the Brazilian Army was assigned to provide personnel, material, and facilities for building migrant reception facilities. Meanwhile, the Commander of the Brazilian Air Force was responsible for integrating logistical support by providing transportation, setting up a Field Hospital Module, and carrying out the relocation of migrants to other parts of Brazil. The directive also instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to communicate deployment orders to all military commanders (Ministério da Defesa 2018).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff then issued *Instrução EMCFA* No. 1/2018, which translated the guidelines in *Diretriz Ministerial* No. 3 into specific operational tasks for each branch of the Armed Forces. The Navy was instructed to support the Field Hospital and the Pacaraima State Hospital by providing healthcare professionals and personnel for meal preparation. Meanwhile, the Army was responsible for managing the distribution of humanitarian aid, including daily food assistance for thousands of migrants, as well as maintaining and managing shelter facilities. The Air Force was tasked with assembling and operating the Field Hospital Module in Pacaraima, providing logistical transportation and relocating migrants to other parts of Brazil (Ministério da Defesa 2018).

In addition to vertical communication between the Brazilian Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces, there is also horizontal communication involving international organizations. Communication with these actors is not based on a superior-subordinate relationship, but rather on coordination mechanisms. The

Operations Command does not have the authority to direct or control the partner organizations involved. Command authority applies only to military elements that are part of the *Força-Tarefa Logística Humanitária*, which consists of personnel from the Army, Navy, and Air Force (Borges, Simoes et al., 2024).

Coordination mechanism is carried out through regular meetings held at two levels: strategic and operational. At the strategic level, coordination involves the Operational Coordinator along with representatives from international organizations and ministries (Borges, Simoes et al., 2024). At the operational level, each UNHCR and IOM unit has an assistant or representative responsible for maintaining direct communication with their counterparts in the FT Log Hum. For example, in the shelter sector, analysts and officers handling shelter, sanitation facilities, and camp management coordinate directly with the mayor, lieutenant colonel, shelter coordinator, and other responsible personnel in the field (Borges, Oliveira, et al., 2024). This communication is carried out not only through formal mechanisms, such as official meetings or emails, but also through informal channels, such as during day-to-day operational activities. (Borges, Simões et al. 2024, 14).

The first form of law enforcement activity under *Operação Acolhida* is to assist policy implementers in interpreting regulations and formulating the organization's response to those policies. This support was provided through the issuance of *Diretriz Ministerial* No. 3. This circular was drafted in accordance with *Decreto 9.285/2018* dan *Decreto nº 9.286/2018*, which recognized the vulnerable conditions in the state of Roraima resulting from the increasing flow of migrants from Venezuela, leading to uncontrolled population growth, disruptions in the

provision of public services, and a growing need for humanitarian assistance for migrants. Consequently, the federal government established the Federal Committee for Emergency Assistance to receive these individuals (Ministério da Defesa 2018). *Diretriz Ministerial* No. 3 not only explains the background, legal basis, and objectives of *Operação Acolhida* but also outlines the organizational response to the policy by establishing coordination of its implementation under the Ministry of Defense and assigning tasks to each branch of the Armed Forces.

The federal government also provides technical resources, which took the form of pre-deployment training for personnel participating in *Operação Acolhida*. In the first phase, centralized training was conducted for the entire contingent at the Military Regional Command garrison. At this stage, personnel participated in constructive simulations designed to train them in resolving various problems resembling real-world conditions encountered during *Operação Acolhida*, thereby giving them a clear picture of the situations they would face in the field (Moraes, Simoes, 2024).

In the second phase, FT Log Hum conducted a briefing at the Boa Vista, Garrison involving various international organizations. This briefing was provided to each contingent group according to the personnel arrival rotation schedule. Through this coordination, IOM and UNHCR provided materials on the characteristics of humanitarian missions and guidelines for the protection of migrants (Moraes and Simoes 2024).

The second form of law enforcement activity is reflected in the use of remuneration powers, where financial incentives are provided to support implementing organizations. In the case of *Operação Acolhida*, the federal

government allocated additional budgetary resources to the Ministry of Defense to enable the Brazilian Armed Forces to carry out the operation. Between 2018 and 2020, these funds were used to support emergency reception and humanitarian assistance for Venezuelan migrants, as well as the reception and relocation of vulnerable migrants, along with strengthening border controls. The total budget allocated to these activities amounted to R$679.44 million, of which R$323.4 million was spent during the first two years of operation (Brizolara and Lima 2021).

In contrast, the relationship between the Brazilian Government and UNHCR or IOM does not reflect the use of remuneration power. In the concept of remuneration power, the federal government influences implementing organizations by providing incentives or material rewards so that they are willing to support policy implementation. However, in *Operação Acolhida* there is no evidence that the Brazilian Government provided financial incentives to UNHCR or IOM to obtain their compliance. On the contrary, the two international organizations also provided resources for carrying out the operation. For example, UNHCR distributes aid through the Cash-Based Intervention (CBI) program to beneficiaries. In July 2020, for example, UNHCR distributed more than BRL 316,605 through the CBI program, so that the total distribution throughout 2020 reached more than BRL 2 million and reached 1,101 families or around 3,464 beneficiaries (UNHCR 2020). Meanwhile, IOM supports the interiorization strategy by purchasing around 600 commercial flight ticket (IOM 2021).

3.2 Characteristic of Implementing Agencies

3.2.1 Competence and Size of the Agency Staff

The Brazilian Armed Forces applied their competence to maintain security at the shelters. This capability was reflected in the implementation of systematic security procedures, such as 24-hour guarding of shelter entrances by two military personnel, identity card checks for residents entering and leaving, and inspections of bags and personal belongings to prevent the entry of items that could endanger residents' safety. Sharp objects and cutting tools, such as gardening and construction equipment, were also temporarily secured and returned the following day, allowing residents to continue using them for work (Vasconcelos and Machado 2021).

The Brazilian Armed Forces also possess the competence to provide and develop the infrastructure required to support the implementation of *Operação Acolhida*. This technical capability was demonstrated through the involvement of the 6th Construction Engineering Battalion in installing infrastructure for *Operação Acolhida* bases in Boa Vista and Pacaraima, as well as in constructing and renovating humanitarian shelters in both locations. Furthermore, the Armed Forces established healthcare facilities, such as Protection and Care Area for newly arrived migrants and a field hospital used to treat patients during the COVID-19 pandemic (Silva 2021).

In addition to personnel competence, the size of the implementing agency's staff also supported the effective implementation of *Operação Acolhida* In December 2019, *Operação Acolhida* was carried out by the Armed Forces' VII

Contingent, with personnel deployed across the cities of Boa Vista, Pacaraima, and Manaus, as shown in the table below.

Table 5. Composition of Brazilian Armed Forces Personnel in Contingent VII

Participants	Officirs			Enlist Personnel			Total
	Boa Vista	Pacaraima	Manaus	Boa Vista	Pacaraima	Manaus	
Navy	10	3	1	21	2	1	38
Army	99	19	8	283	85	41	535
Air Force	3	4	0	0	2	0	9
	112	26	9	304	89	42	582

Source: Silva & Rodriuges (2020), according to data Sumário Diário de Situação NR 345/19

Operação Acolhida continued through periodic contingent rotations. One of them was the 10th Contingent of *Operação Acolhida*, which began operating in the regions of Boa Vista, Pacaraima, and Manaus with the involvement of 584 military personnel from the Southeast Military Command until April 2021 (Ministry of Defense, 2021). By January 2022, around 7,200 military personnel had been involved in *Operação Acolhida* through 12 contingents serving on a rotating basis (Kwasiniki 2022).

However, the implementation of *Operação Acolhida* has not solely relied on military capacity. This operation also involves international organizations with specialized competencies in migration and refugee management. In this regard, the IOM and UNHCR are two international actors with different staff structures and expertise according to their respective fields of work. IOM allocates its staff to several areas: internalization, protection, direct assistance, documentation,

administration, information management, and communication. To facilitate coordination with the FT Log Hum, IOM also appoints dedicated coordinators for each main axis of *Operação Acolhida*, such as internalization, protection (direct assistance), and border management (documentation). Meanwhile, areas such as administration, communication, protection, and information management support the overall operational axis (Borges, Oliveira, et al. 2024).

IOM's capabilities are evident in its involvement in various operational phases. At the border management stage, IOM assists the Federal Police in the pre-documentation process for migrants applying for temporary residency permits in Brazil. Health support is also provided at sanitation checkpoints, including vaccinations and basic health services. In shelter management, IOM, along with FT Log Hum, manages Reception and Support Posts, which provide temporary housing, food, drinks, and sanitation facilities for migrants. Non-food assistance, such as hygiene kits, is provided to migrants outside the official operational shelters. At the internalization stage, IOM handles document checks, travel logistics arrangements, and assists migrants with their arrival in their destinations. Integration support includes training and job search (Borges, Oliveira, et al. 2024).

In addition to the IOM, UNHCR also divides its staff into several units: protection, field, and integration. The protection unit works within the border management framework, interviewing migrants and refugees applying for asylum, international protection, or residence permits. This process gathers information on the migrants' conditions and needs, which is then coordinated with local governments. This coordination addresses various issues, such as health and other basic needs, before migrants enter shelters (Borges, Oliveira, et al. 2024).

Meanwhile, the field unit is responsible for managing the shelter, including overseeing infrastructure, sanitation, the environment, and water and hygiene systems. This unit also oversees migrant entry and exit procedures in accordance with applicable operational regulations. On the internalization axis, the integration unit collaborates with the FT Log Hum and the Internalization Coordination Center to support the relocation of migrants to various regions of Brazil (Borges, Oliveira et al. 2024).

3.2.2 Degree of Hierarchical Control

The implementation of *Operação Acolhida* demonstrated the existence of a top-down hierarchical control. The CFAE acted as the strategic authority responsible for coordinating emergency relief measures, projects, and activities developed with the support of the federal, state, district, and municipal governments (Brasil 2018). To implement the actions established by the Committee, the Ministry of Defense established the FT Log Hum by appointing a General Officer as Operational Coordinator through Resolution No. 1 issued by the Presidency of the Republic/Civil Council on February 21, 2018 (Kanaan 2019).

The chain of command is reinforced through *Diretriz Ministerial* No. 3, which assigns the Commander of the Armed Forces to carry out operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces then forwards instructions to each force commander to support the Operational Coordinator with personnel and materials (Ministério da Defesa 2018). Through *Instrução EMCFA* no. 1/2018 issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces actions are carried out in accordance with the instructions given to the force commanders.

However, this hierarchical control does not apply across all actors involved in the operation. International organizations such as the UNHCR and the IOM act as partners, not subordinates to the Operational Coordinator. Therefore, although the general is seen as the operational leader in practice, he does not have the authority to command these institutions. A strict hierarchical structure applies only to military elements such as the Army, Navy, and Air Force, which are part of the FT Log Hum (Borges, Simoes, et al. 2024).

3.2.3 Political Resources

The federal government mandated and officially authorised the Armed Forces to carry out *Operação Acolhida*. To implement the measures established by the CFAE, the Ministry of Defence formed the FT Log Hum in Roraima. The Armed Forces subsequently received a mandate via *Diretriz Ministerial* No. 3, which officially authorized them to conduct *Operação Acolhida* under the coordination of the Ministry of Defense. Through this directive, the military was authorized to use its personnel, resources, and operational capabilities to support the logistical activities of public agencies and contribute to humanitarian assistance (Brazil 2018)

3.2.4 Vitality of an Organization

The vitality of the FT Log Hum organization is evident in its ability to adapt work mechanisms when facing the Covid-19 pandemic. Even though in January 2020 information regarding the characteristics of the virus, transmission patterns, and the availability of test kits was still very limited, the Task Force had developed a protocol for handling Covid-19 which focused on identification and isolation. When the first suspected case was discovered on March 17 2020, the protocol was

immediately implemented by isolating more than 1,000 people who had a history of contact with the suspect, consisting of around 600 people in Pacaraima, 300 people in Boa Vista, and 100 people in Manaus. FT Log Hum then formed a Covid Office, which involved various agencies, and held coordination meetings three times a day to monitor developments and determine handling steps (Barros, 2022).

Adjustments were also made to service infrastructure. Within about 48 hours, the field hospital was moved from Pacaraima to Boa Vista because that location was considered better suited to handling the pandemic. All attention was then shifted to handling the pandemic (Castro, Mello, and Sousa 2022). Then came the solution from *Operação Acolhida*, namely the construction of a protection and maintenance area as part of the strategy for handling Covid-19. The Protection Area is used to isolate suspected cases and confirmed patients who do not require intensive care, while the Treatment Area functions as a field hospital. Construction of the facility began in mid-March 2020, and within about a month, 80 beds were available (Barros, 2022).

The ability to maintain operations in the midst of a pandemic is not only demonstrated by FT Log Hum. UNHCR and IOM continue to carry out their functions amidst increasing challenges due to the COVID-19 pandemic. UNHCR is strengthening its program by working with partners to provide information on the Brazilian Government's Emergency Assistance related to COVID-19. In addition, UNHCR identifies the most vulnerable groups and distributes cash assistance to refugees and migrants who have not received government assistance or whose assistance has not been able to meet their families' basic needs (Borges and Sant’ana Junior 2024)

IOM also showed a similar commitment. The organization continues its relocation program for Venezuelans by facilitating the transfer of approximately 500 people each month through the provision of commercial airline tickets funded by IOM (IOM, 2020). In addition to maintaining the program's implementation, IOM ensures that refugees and migrants can access various forms of assistance. Many refugees and migrants experience problems because they do not have internet access to register themselves as recipients of emergency financial assistance from the Brazilian Government. IOM formed a task force in Manaus and Boa Vista to assist the registration process, and more than 1,500 refugees and migrants completed their registration (IOM, 2020).

3.2.5 Degree of Open Communication

The level of openness in vertical communication within civilian organizations is higher than in military organizations. Civilian organizations have a relatively simple organizational structure, consisting of staff, supervisors, managers, and leadership in Brasília. Civilian organizations also do not distinguish based on job level or rank. Civilian staff have easy access to their superiors, enabling faster problem-solving. In contrast, the military has a longer hierarchical structure with various ranks, such as sergeant, lieutenant, captain, second lieutenant, major, and lieutenant colonel. The more hierarchical levels that must be passed through, the longer the path that information must take to reach superiors (Borges et al. 2024).

3.3 Economic, Social and Political Conditions

3.3.1 Economic Condition

Roraima has the lowest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) among Brazil's 27 states, at around R$14.29 billion, contributing only about 0.2% to the national GDP (IBGE, 2019). Demographically, it also has one of the smallest populations, with around 605,800 inhabitants, or only 0.3% of Brazil's total population (IBGE 2019). The state had previously faced a financial emergency, in which annual net revenue was lower than its consolidated debt. Expenditures on public employee salaries, interest, and amortization exceeded 70% of the net revenue received, while total government liabilities were greater than the available cash reserves. This condition created serious obstacles to the provision of public services and had the potential to cause widespread disruption across the sectors of public security, health, education, and government administration (Roraima 2018). The large-scale arrival of Venezuelan citizens further increased the burden on public service expenditures.

This situation indicates that Roraima's economic capacity is limited in independently managing the impact of migration. Consequently, the federal government provides financial support to strengthen *Operação Acolhida*. In addition to alleviating economic pressure on Roraima, *Operação Acolhida* utilizes an internal relocation program to help migrants secure economic opportunities in other regions. UNHCR conducted a study of 360 Venezuelan families who had been relocated. The study found that more than 77% found jobs within a few weeks of arriving in their destination cities. These families reported that their income increased within six to eight weeks of settling into their new locations (UNHCR and IOM 2021).

3.3.2 Social Condition

The surge in migrants has directly affected the health sector in Roraima. The number of patients treated at Roraima General Hospital rose sharply to the point where the facility could no longer function optimally, particularly in serving Brazilian citizens. Within 36 hours, 18 critically ill Venezuelan patients were treated at the hospital, 13 of whom required surgery. This situation placed immense strain on intensive care units, trauma services, and hospital bed availability (Agencia Brazil 2019).

Beyond the health sector, the state's limited capacity is also evident in housing for migrants and refugees. All 13 official shelters in Roraima have reached maximum capacity, housing approximately 6,000 people. Outside of official shelters, the number of unhoused migrants is far greater; consequently, many are forced to live in dilapidated or abandoned buildings lacking electricity and water, or even on the streets. In the city of Boa Vista, an estimated 23,000 Venezuelans occupy uninhabitable buildings, while more than 3,000 others live on the streets (Doctors Without Borders 2019).

3.3.3 Political Condition

President Jair Bolsonaro supported the continuation of *Operação Acolhida* by deciding to extend it as a national strategy for addressing the Venezuelan migration crisis. This commitment was realized through the allocation of extraordinary funds totalling R$223,853,000.00 (Brazil 2019), supplemented by an additional R$31.8 million to finance emergency aid and strengthen the humanitarian reception program for Venezuelans (Agência Câmara 2019). The federal government's decision to provide substantial budgetary support

for *Operação Acolhida* was criticised by several legislators, who believed federal budget priorities did not align with the needs of the people of Roraima. Senator Mecias de Jesus stated, "*Roraima owes more than R$6 billion and has no way to pay this debt. And instead of opening credit to help the Brazilian people, to help the people of Roraima, who are suffering there, credit is being opened to continue helping the people of Venezuela*" (Jesus 2019). Similar criticism was also expressed by Deputy Jonathan de Jesus, who stated that, "*The amount he sends to Venezuela is higher than the budget of many cities in the state. The federal government has spent R$ 12,000 on Venezuelans. Compare that to "Bolsa Família*" (Folha 2019).

3.4 Disposition of Implementers

Another determining factor in successful policy implementation is the attitude of the implementers. Van Meter and Van Horn state that there are three elements that influence policy implementation: cognition (understanding) of the policy, direct responses to the policy, and the intensity of those responses. First, the cognitive aspect relates to understanding, namely the extent to which implementers understand the specific standards and objectives to be achieved. Second, there are direct responses to policy standards and objectives, which may take the form of acceptance, neutrality, or rejection. A high level of acceptance among implementers toward policy objectives increases the likelihood of successful implementation. On the other hand, if implementers do not accept or even reject these objectives, the policy may not run optimally. Third, the level of intensity in the implementers' disposition also affects policy performance. Implementers who have strong

negative attitudes tend to openly resist program objectives, which can lead to debates among colleagues (Meter and Horn 1975, 472-473.

In the context of *Operação Acolhida*, the Brazilian Armed Forces demonstrated a clear understanding of the operation's standards and objectives. This understanding was followed by their acceptance of the policy, as reflected in the willingness of each military branch to carry out the roles and responsibilities assigned to them. The Navy accepted responsibility for supporting healthcare services by providing medical personnel for the Field Hospital and Pacaraima Hospital. This commitment was demonstrated by deploying general practitioners, dentists, pharmacists, and military nurses to the Advanced Care Post. The ACP functioned as a field hospital with a capacity of around 20 beds to treat patients with low to medium levels of complexity. When the ACP reached full capacity, patients were referred to Pacaraima Hospital, which also received support from military healthcare personnel (Oliveira 2018).

The Air Force also demonstrated its acceptance of the policy by carrying out its responsibilities in logistics transportation, migrant relocation, and healthcare support. This was reflected in the transportation of humanitarian supplies using Boeing 767 aircraft, with a total cargo volume of 2,129 m^3 (Araujo and Sparta 2020). In addition, the Air Force facilitated the relocation of approximately 548 migrants to different parts of Brazil using Brazilian Armed Forces aircraft (R4V 2019). It also supported healthcare services by providing basic medical care for Venezuelan migrants, including inpatient wards, general medicine, pediatrics, gynecology, laboratory services, emergency care, and critical care units. These

facilities had been operating since 26 April 2018 as a complement to Pacaraima Hospital (Franchi 2019).

The Army demonstrated a strong understanding of its responsibilities in managing humanitarian aid distribution and shelter operations. Meals were prepared at several military facilities, including the 7th Jungle Infantry Battalion, which also serves as the headquarters of the Roraima Border Command, the 10th Jungle Field Artillery Group and the Boa Vista Air Base. The meals were then distributed daily to shelters, reaching more than 25,000 meals per day (Vasconcelos and Machado 2021). Shelter management was carried out through a clear division of responsibilities among military personnel. Each shelter was managed by around eight personnel, including officers, non-commissioned officers, corporals, and soldiers. Officers and non-commissioned officers deployed from outside Roraima served as coordinators responsible for overseeing shelter operations. Meanwhile, military personnel already stationed in Roraima handled daily operational tasks, such as checking residents' identification cards at shelter entrances and exits, distributing meals, and managing the storage of refugees' personal belongings (Vasconcelos and Santos 2022).

The Armed Forces' disposition was also evident in their intensity in maintaining the implementation of *Operação Acolhida* in the face of the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Personnel worked day and night to establish shelters for suspected cases and medical treatment areas for confirmed inpatients, with a service capacity superior to that of the city's general hospitals. At the same time, the Armed Forces implemented strict health protocols in shelters, bus

terminals, and spontaneous settlements. The protocols were updated weekly in accordance with the evolving pandemic situation (Castro, Mello, and Sousa 2022).

In addition to the involvement of the Brazilian Armed Forces, the implementation of *Operação Acolhida* is also supported by international organizations such as UNHCR and IOM. Both organizations demonstrate a clear understanding of the operation's objective of providing emergency assistance and protection to migrants in vulnerable situations caused by the humanitarian crisis. This understanding is reflected in their willingness to support the policy by actively contributing to its implementation through a range of humanitarian assistance programs for Venezuelan migrants in Brazil. In response to a request from the Brazilian Government, IOM supports three shelters by providing temporary food assistance for 272 people in São Paulo, Porto Velho, and Palhoça. This assistance complements the regular food distribution provided by Brazil's Ministry of Defense (R4V 2019).

IOM supported the interiorization program, which voluntarily relocated Venezuelan migrants to different parts of Brazil. Through this program, 311 refugees and migrants were relocated under family reunification and employment schemes (R4V, 2019). As part of this process, IOM provided commercial flights to complement the military transportation support. Meanwhile, UNHCR benefited 121 families (281 individuals) participating in the interiorization program. UNHCR operates a cash grant assistance scheme to support employment-based relocation modalities (UNHCR 2021). The program was strengthened through an updated CBI strategy in Roraima at the request of the Brazilian Federal Government. Cash assistance was provided to relocated Venezuelans working in private companies to

ensure they could meet their basic needs during the initial period of their placement before receiving their first salary (R4V 2019).

The level of involvement of both organizations increased further during the COVID-19 pandemic, when humanitarian needs became more complex. Despite the growing challenges created by the pandemic, UNHCR remained actively involved by distributing large-scale humanitarian assistance to Venezuelan refugees and migrants across Brazil. In the Boa Vista shelters, UNHCR distributed hygiene kits, household cleaning supplies, adult diapers, mattresses, mattress protectors, buckets, and water containers to meet the needs of thousands of refugees and migrants. In Pacaraima, it also provided hygiene kits, soap, sleeping mats, and plastic tarpaulins to families from the Pemon-Taurepang Indigenous community. UNHCR's support also extended to Manaus, where it distributed hygiene supplies, cloth face masks, mosquito nets, and cleaning kits to Indigenous families living outside shelters during COVID-19 mobility restrictions (UNHCR 2021).

IOM also increased its response by strengthening healthcare services during the COVID-19 pandemic. In cooperation with the Boa Vista Municipal Health Department, IOM reinforced the local healthcare system by providing medical personnel to treat patients at the Primary Health Unit located in the Protection and Care Area (PCA). In addition, IOM provided ambulances to transport patients between health units, local hospitals, and the PCA. This support helped reduce pressure on Boa Vista’s emergency transportation system while ensuring that patients continued to have access to emergency healthcare services (IOM 2020).

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

4.1 Performance

The *Operação Acolhida* policy has clear standards and objectives, as enshrined in law, aimed at providing emergency assistance to individuals made vulnerable by the migration crisis.. Operational standards are clearly defined through ministerial directives. Resources are adequate, as the government consistently allocates funds for emergency aid and the reception of Venezuelan migrants. This funding enables training, technical support, and incentives, while ensuring implementing agencies maintain sufficient, competent personnel. The federal government deploys the armed forces and receives support from UNHCR and IOM to address migrant needs related to border management, shelter provision, and relocation. Overall, the implementing agencies demonstrate strong performance, backed by competent staff, a clear command structure, robust political support, and the ability to adapt to emerging issues. The only weakness lies in internal military communication, which tends to be insular, as orders must pass through multiple ranks before reaching the upper echelons.

Inter-organizational communication and task execution also function well. Instructions flow consistently down the chain of command, and inter-agency coordination occurs regularly at both strategic and operational levels. Thanks to clear standards and objectives, implementers understand and accept what is expected of them. A positive attitude among implementers has kept *Operação Acolhida* running smoothly, even under the pressure of the COVID-19 pandemic. The only factor truly hindering the operation is the economic, social, and political

situation within the state of Roraima itself. The state is facing financial difficulties, hospitals and shelters are over capacity and some legislators openly criticize the use of funds for Venezuelan migrants. These issues slow down implementation, regardless of how clear the established standards are or how committed the implementers may be. Nevertheless, the federal government continues to allocate resources to cover shortfalls that Roraima cannot meet on its own, thereby enabling operations to continue despite existing local limitations.

4.2 Recommendation

The author acknowledges several shortcomings in this study. First, this study focused solely on the implementation of *Operação Acolhida* during the Jair Bolsonaro administration from 2019 to 2022. Therefore, future research could examine the implementation of *Operação Acolhida* during subsequent administrations to determine whether there is continuity or change in policy priorities, coordination mechanisms, and implementation strategies.

Second, this study focused on analyzing the policy implementation process based on the variables proposed by Van Meter and Van Horn. This study did not address the long-term impact of *Operação Acolhida*'s implementation on Venezuelan migrants as beneficiaries of the policy. Therefore, further research is recommended to examine the sustainability of the policy's outcomes, particularly regarding changes in the social and economic conditions of migrants following the relocation program.

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